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The WTO was just an idea in 1944, at the Bretton Woods conference that established 
the other major international financial institutions, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund; the WTO wasn’t formally established until 1995.   Just 13 years later the 
organization’s future appears to be in jeopardy.  Some question whether the organization 
will last through the next five years, let alone the next 35 or more. This issue brief 
argues that the future of the institution — and of its ability to deliver on its stated trade 
and development goals — rests on the successful completion of the current round of 
negotiations. 
One reason for the current impasse in the WTO is that the potential gains in terms 
of market access from the deals on the table are quite small for developing countries.  
Another is that many developing countries argue that the very policies that many developed 
and middle income countries used between 1944 and 1995 to orchestrate a longer-range 
development path could be outlawed under new proposals from the developed countries.  
Developing countries are being asked to trade market access to the developed world in 
return for new agreements that may curtail the developing world’s ability to deploy a 
long-run development strategy.
The WTO has a long future if it focuses on implementing and maintaining its original 
agreements that attempt to provide a level playing field for the global economy and 
provide a transparent system for settling disputes.  If the institution continues to 
crowd out the space for developing countries to deploy effective policies for longer-
run development, it may lose its footing as the premier organization governing the 
world trading system. That will not be good for the WTO, nor for global development 
aspirations.
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Why Developing Countries Feel They are Being asked To “Do as We 
Say, Not as We Do.”  
Though Uruguay Round negotiations were successfully completed in 1994 and 
culminated in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995,  
when the developed world proposed another round of global trade talks in 2001 in 
Doha, Qatar,  developing countries balked, citing the shortcomings of the previous 
round. Indeed, they accepted new negotiations only on the condition that development 
issues form the centerpiece of the negotiations. 
On the blackboard, making trade work for the poor is fairly simple: dismantle tariffs 
and other restrictions on imports, and free nations to produce as much as they can 
sell of the goods they produce best relative to 
other countries and other options in their own 
economies (i.e., produce and export where they 
have a comparative advantage). If every country 
did that, producers would get access to more 
markets, and consumers would have optimized 
choice, low prices, and high quality — all nations 
would benefit, at least in the short run.
On the blacktop, however, things are different.  
One important difference between theory and reality is that the theory of comparative 
advantage is a static one. Countries focus on what they have a comparative advantage 
in during the present, rather than thinking long-term about what they might like to have 
a comparative advantage in further into the future.  For instance, if South Korea fully 
liberalized its economy in 1960 it would have had a comparative advantage in rice.  That 
may have worked well for a few years until rice prices fell.  Instead, they orchestrated a 
long-run development path that put them at the technological frontier in electronics and 
automobiles.  The opportunity costs of charting such a path in the short and medium 
run were fairly high, but now that they enjoy an OECD-style standard of living most 
Koreans think it was worth it.
At the trade talks, developing nations were asked to open their doors to the global 
corporations with major reductions in import tariffs and investment regulations, while 
the United States and Europe made limited cuts in agricultural tariffs and subsidies. The 
poorer nations saw themselves as a group of kindergarteners playing the Italian national 
soccer team: their domestic farmers and industrial capitalists were doomed to fall by 
the wayside. The World Bank estimates cited below show that developed countries 
would have earned five times as much in monetary gains as the developing world, where 
average income gains would have been less than one penny per day per person. 
Nonetheless, after five years of negotiations, a bargain seemed plausible in theory — 
developing countries could have access to the agricultural markets of rich countries 
in exchange for rich countries having access to the industrial markets of developing 
countries. Benin could sell its cotton to the Gap; the United States could sell its 
pharmaceuticals in Brazil. However, the Western nations, where most of the mega-
“ A pro-poor Doha Round could increase 
global income by as much as $520 billion 
and lift an additional 144 million people 
out of poverty. This is why so many 
hundreds of us come together today.”
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companies are headquartered, were demanding that developing countries open their 
markets immediately. 
That might be good for the short run, but societies are concerned with long-run growth, 
not just quick fixes.  The question, therefore, is whether short-term gains would be at the 
cost of longer-term benefits. Developing countries often look at the example of the U.S. 
and European economies, and more recently, the economies of South Korea and China, 
all of which moved into the world marketplace slowly and strategically, protecting 
their major exporting industries in order to nurture them into world markets. China’s 
computer maker, Lenovo, is an example. The company was created by the government 
and integrated into the world market strategically over a period of many years; it recently 
purchased IBM’s PC division and is now a world leader in high-technology electronics. 
Acer Computer from Taiwan and Hyundai and Kia Motors from South Korea followed 
similar longer-range development paths.  Poorer countries thus see developed country 
proposals as policies of “do as we say, not as we do.”  
Shrinking Gains 
In a negotiation developing countries might be willing to “trade away” some of the 
space to deploy the policies discussed above in exchange for increased market access to 
developed countries.  What has made such a deal questionable is that the gains from 
market access to developed countries are relatively small, especially when juxtaposed 
with the potential costs.
The initial prospects of a Doha deal seemed promising for developing countries in 
terms of market access. At the 2003 Cancun Ministerial meeting of the WTO, Eveline 
Herfkens, former World Bank executive director and current executive coordinator for 
the United Nations’ Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), asserted: “A pro-poor Doha 
Round could increase global income by as much 
as $520 billion and lift an additional 144 million 
people out of poverty. This is why so many 
hundreds of us come together today.”1 
Yet new projections, from the same sources cited  
by Herfkens, now estimate potential welfare 
gains at just $287 billion in the year 2015 — just 
one-third of their level two years ago. Projections of gains for developing countries 
have dropped to $90 billion — 0.8 percent of GDP — a reduction of 83 percent, while 
developing countries’ share of global gains has fallen from 60 percent to just 31 
percent.2 This is of grave concern given that the current negotiations are billed as the 
“development round” of global trade talks.3  
Perhaps more alarming is that these estimates presume a scenario of “full” global trade 
liberalization. In other words, the models assume that all tariffs and non-tariff trade 
barriers are completely eliminated in the world economy, a highly unlikely scenario for 
the current round. To reflect more accurately the more probable results of the present 
“ Slashing tariffs (that are already fairly low) 
will restrict the ability of these countries 
to foster new industries so that they may 
integrate into the world economy and 
maintain social programs for the poor.”
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negotiations, the new reports include projections for a “likely Doha scenario” of partial 
liberalization. 
The “likely” Doha benefits that the models predict are exhibited in Table 1. Under this 
scenario, global gains for 2015 are just $96 billion, with only $16 billion going to the 
developing world. The developing country benefits are 0.16 percent of GDP. In per capita 
terms, that amounts to $3.13, or less than a penny per day per capita for those living in 
developing countries. Although the most attention in the negotiations has been focused 
on agriculture, developing country gains from “likely” agricultural reforms amount 
to less than 0.1 percent of GDP — just $9 billion. Likely gains from northern subsidy 
reductions are projected at barely $1 billion.4 Of the benefits that will flow to developing 
countries, only a few countries will receive those benefits. Half of all the benefits to 
developing countries are expected to flow to just eight countries: Argentina, Brazil 
(which stands to receive 23 percent of the developing country benefit), China, India, 
Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam.5
Another major area of negotiation in the Doha Round is services negotiations. Services 
trade has been growing faster than goods trade since the 1980s. Developed countries 
are pushing developing countries 
to open up their services markets 
— especially in the financial and 
telecommunications sectors — in 
exchange for market access in 
agriculture. 
Like the estimates in goods trade, 
services trade liberalization is 
expected to yield relatively small 
benefits, the majority of which 
would go to developed countries. 
Adding the liberalization of goods 
and services trade together, the 
total benefits for developing 
countries amounts to $123.5 
billion under full liberalization — 1.1 percent of GDP — and $28.7 billion under a more 
conservative, likely Doha scenario. Goods and services trade combined, a likely deal 
would bring a one-time increase of 0.28 percent in the level of global GDP in 2015.7
real Costs
The benefits from trade liberalization, albeit shrinking, are real. But so are the costs, 
both in the short term and the long. The costs and benefits of trade liberalization are 
not evenly distributed across countries, within them, or across generations. Far too little 
attention has been paid to the costs of trade liberalization and to how the gains should 
be redistributed to those who are adversely affected by it. Key among the costs of 
liberalization are those associated with adjustment, which take the form of tariff revenue 
Doha Benefits vs. Nama Tariff losses6
in US 2001 billions  “likely benefits” NAMA tariffs losses
Developed  79.9  38.0
Developing  16.1  63.4
 
Selected Developing regions
MIddle East and North Africa  -.06  7.0
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.4  1.7
Latin America and the Caribbean  7.9  10.7
Selected Countries
Brazil  3.6  3.1
India  2.2  7.9
Mexico  -0.9  0.4
Bangladesh  -0.1  0.04
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losses and job losses. Table 1 juxtaposes the projected benefits of the Doha Round with 
estimates of projected tariff revenue losses. The World Bank models and other models 
of trade liberalization make the assumption that nations’ fiscal balances are fixed — in 
other words, any losses in tariff revenue are offset by lump-sum taxes. In the real world, 
however, such taxation schemes face stiff resistance.8 The United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has published data on projected tariff revenue 
losses under the Doha Round for a scenario which resembles the likely Doha outcome.  
Tariff revenue losses can be significant. Total tariff losses for developing countries 
under the “non-agricultural market access” — or manufactured goods — aspect of the 
negotiations could be $63.4 billion, or almost four times the level of benefits.9  
Slashing tariffs (that are already fairly low) will 
restrict the ability of these countries to foster new 
industries so that they may integrate into the world 
economy and maintain social programs for the 
poor. Such programs are vital components of a 
longer-range development strategy. Most developing 
countries rely on tariffs for more than one quarter 
of their tax revenue. For smaller nations with little 
diversification in their economies, tariff revenues 
provide the core of government budgets.   In a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, Jagdish 
Bhagwati commented: “If poor countries that are dependent on tariff revenues for social 
spending risk losing those revenues by cutting tariffs, international agencies such as the 
World Bank should stand ready to make up the difference until their tax systems can be 
fixed to raise revenues in other, more appropriate, ways.”10 While there is indeed evidence 
that consumption taxes are superior forms of generating welfare, economists have 
shown that tariffs may be preferable in developing countries with large informal sectors 
that cannot be taxed efficiently.11
Although the net benefits for many countries are projected to be positive, such benefits 
will be the result of significant structural changes away from the development of 
knowledge-based assets and back toward primary commodities and low-technology 
manufacturing. Primary commodities are experiencing a temporary upswing in prices, 
but the long-term trends are not encouraging. According to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the price of non-energy commodities have declined by 30 percent 
between 1980 and 2005, and they are likely to continue to do so in the future. What’s 
more, the terms of trade–the average prices of agricultural commodities sold by 
developing countries relative to the price of manufactured goods purchased from 
developed countries — have fallen by close to 70 percent during the period between  
1961 to 2001.12 
Taking the longer-term view, it is evident that when commodity prices go down again, 
there may not be much industry left to pick up the slack in some developing countries 
since almost all of the projected employment increases would be in the agriculture or 
“ At present, the negotiations for the Doha 
round are not likely to resume with much 
vibrance until well after the 2008 U.S. 
presidential elections. Such a break is 
actually welcome.”
6
The Frederick S. Pardee cenTer For 
The STudy oF The Longer-range FuTure
apparel industries. Manufacturing industries such as machinery, non-ferrous metals, 
electronics, and motor vehicles would be particularly hard-hit. For Brazil and Argentina, 
this would translate into job losses in cities and expansion in the countryside. In Asia, 
there would be a movement of people out of higher technology manufacturing and into 
apparel jobs. Both adjustments underscore the slide in wages and level of technological 
sophistication that would occur under a liberalization scenario that does not devote 
significant attention to paying adjustment costs.
a Way Forward
At present, the negotiations for the Doha round are not likely to resume with much 
vibrance until well after the 2008 U.S. presidential elections. Such a break is actually 
welcome.  Negotiators need to sit back and remember that they are dealing with an 
institution that is in its infancy and that needs to last far into the future.  That will only 
happen if countries see its benefits as long-lasting. 
Developing countries have thus far received the short 
end of the stick in these talks because they constitute 
a small part of global markets and thus have less 
negotiating clout — even though the negotiations 
were specifically aimed at addressing this fact. By 
reintroducing development to the Doha round, 
the negotiations are more apt to be successful, the 
institution will be more apt to be intact, and a fairer playing field will be set for long-run 
development in the poorer regions of the world.
For this to occur, developed countries must make several changes in their policies.
First, the United States and Europe should agree to honor WTO rulings that have deemed 
their subsidies for cotton and sugar to be in violation of existing trade rules that forbid 
exporting products at prices lower than what it cost to make them. This would give a 
tangible boost to farmers in West Africa and Latin America and send a strong signal to 
developing countries that developed nations are willing to honor the rules of the WTO.
Second, Western nations should take seriously the proposal by many African nations to 
tame global businesses that demand unfair prices for resources used in farm production 
and reap billions in profits on the sale of final products. African nations made numerous 
proposals during the round to this end, specifically to make room for international 
supply management schemes to raise prices and to curb the oligopolistic behavior of 
large foreign commodity firms, but were ignored by the developed nations.13
Third, negotiators should recognize the long-standing WTO principle of “special and 
differentiated treatment” for poorer nations. Developed nations should roll back 
patent laws that impede poorer nations from manufacturing cheaper generic drugs, 
and they should allow poorer countries to exempt staples of their local economy 
such as corn, rice and wheat from deregulation.  One proposal is to allow nations to 
have a “situational” approach that would allow them to waive certain parts of their 
“ One hopes the WTO will survive this  
crisis and that five years from now —  
and 35 years from now — there will  
be a WTO.”
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commitments to pursue a specific long-run development plan submitted to the WTO 
ahead of the plan’s implementation.
Fourth, for the measures that are agreed upon, international institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank should step in and help developing 
nations cover the costs of adjustment such as tariff losses and job retraining until 
the proper policies can be put in place on the ground. The IMF’s Trade Integration 
Mechanism is already in place for such a task but is not ambitious enough and should 
not come with additional conditionality. The IMF plan also leaves little room for 
incorporating costs of adjustment and the Fund is often criticized for tying further 
reforms to their policies. 14
Fifth, there should be a moratorium on regional and bilateral trade deals. These deals 
exploit the asymmetric nature of bargaining power between developed and developing 
nations, divert trade away from nations with true comparative advantage, and curtail 
the ability of developing countries to deploy effective policies for long-run development.
One hopes the WTO will survive this crisis and that five years from now — and 35 years 
from now — there will be a WTO. Its work is not finished and there is much that it can 
contribute to global development. To do so, however, it will need to realign itself to its 
stated development goals. To survive — indeed, to thrive — it needs to redefine itself 
as a development institution. That will be good for the WTO, good for the future of 
global development, good for developing countries, and indeed good for industrialized 
countries.•
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